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Starting out as a Large-Scale Mining (LSM) activity in 
the colonial period, gold mining became more and more 
dominated by artisanal miners in the course of the past 
decades. Now, the pendulum swings back to LSM. What 
is the scope for a relocation and/or reorientation of 
artisanal miners? We study the case of Kamituga, one of 
Banro’s gold concessions in South-Kivu.
Swings of the pendulum: from LSM to ASM, 
and back
The province of South-Kivu – located in eastern 
DR Congo and bordering Rwanda and Burundi – 
holds important deposits of gold. In the colonial 
period, these gold deposits were mined industrially 
(Geenen, 2014; Kyanga Wasso, 2013; Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers, 2004). Artisanal and Small-scale 
Mining (ASM) gradually developed from the 1960s 
onward and accelerated after 1982, when Mobutu 
liberalized the exploitation and trade in minerals.1 
This liberalization occurred within a context of 
economic and financial crisis – triggered by Mobutu’s 
“Zairianisation” and “Radicalisation” measures – 
and was presented as a way for Congolese nationals 
to benefit from their country’s natural resources. As 
a consequence, an increasing number of artisanal 
miners started extracting minerals using simple 
hand tools such as hammers and picks. During the 
two Congo wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003), LSM 
came to a standstill while ASM continued to expand. 
Presently, ASM is one of the most important 
livelihood strategies in DRC. A (gu)estimate by 
the World Bank (2008, p.56) puts employment in 
the artisanal mining sector in the range of 0.8 to 2 
1  Law n°82/039 of November 5th 1982. 
million. Using an average of four to five dependents 
for each miner, this implies that up to 10 million 
people, or 16 percent of DRC’s population, are 
dependent on artisanal mining for their livelihood 
(World Bank 2008: p.7). 
The ASM-based livelihood is however under 
pressure, as the pendulum is swinging back to 
LSM. Over the past decade, mining companies 
have shown renewed interest in DRC – triggered 
first by increasing world prices for minerals, and 
later by a stabilization of the security situation in 
eastern DRC. Since ASM cannot easily be taxed2, 
the Congolese state is eager to further stimulate 
LSM-development. A new Mining Code, issued 
in 2002, aimed to attract more investments from 
private companies, among others by offering an 
advantageous fiscal regime (Mazalto, 2005).3 
While the 2002 Mining Code has helped in attracting 
Foreign Direct Investment to the sector4, it may 
prove detrimental to the sector’s ASM segment. 
Although the code recognizes ASM as a valid 
production mode, it specifies that artisanal activities 
should take place in clearly demarcated Artisanal 
Exploitation Zones (AEZ). In practice, very few AEZ 
were created and the code provides the opportunity 
to close them down if “a new deposit which does not 
2  The bulk of the ASM produce is smuggled out of the 
country (World Bank, 2008, p.56).
3  The 2002 Mining Code revised the 1981 code, and was 
designed to restore DRC’s reputation in terms of business 
environment after the debacle of the nationalizations of mining 
companies by Mobutu in the 1970s.
4  In 2012, mineral rents accounted for an estimated 23.4% 
of GDP, up from 10.6% in 2006 and 0.3% in 2002 (World Bank, 
2013).
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lend itself to artisanal mining has been discovered”.5 
Consequently, LSM companies have the upper hand, 
while ASM largely takes place outside the state’s 
regulatory framework (Geenen and Claessens, 2013; 
Geenen and Hönke, 2014).
Banro in South-Kivu
Just before the start of the first Congo war, the 
Canadian mining company Banro had shown an 
interest in four gold mining sites in South-Kivu 
(Geenen and Claessens, 2013). In 1997, Banro 
obtained 13 exploitation permits for the Twangiza, 
Kamituga, Lugushwa and Namoya  concessions. 
The concessions are part of the 210 kilometer long 
Twangiza-Namoya gold belt that stretches out into 
Maniema Province (Banro, 2014a).6 In 2007, the 
company acquired 14 additional exploration permits, 
covering large areas around their concessions.7 
Banro first focused its exploration activities on 
Twangiza, where it entered the production phase 
in October 2011 (Banro, 2014b). Geenen (2014, 
2013, 2012) and Geenen and Claessens (2013) have 
analyzed how the development of the Twangiza 
mine has led to the dispossession and displacement 
of local communities, and left artisanal miners with 
few alternative livelihoods. Although Banro set up a 
community forum – to discuss issues of resettlement 
and compensation – and organized training- and 
employment programs, these measures have only 
benefitted a relatively small part of the affected 
population and are unlikely to bring relief in the long 
run (Geenen, 2013; Geenen and Claessens, 2013). 
As a consequence, artisanal miners have resisted 
the dispossession, both in words and actions: in 
April 2011, 500-900 artisanal miners reoccupied 
sites within the Twangiza concession (Geenen and 
Radley, 2014). 
Also at Banro’s other concessions, negotiations 
with local communities are expected to pose a huge 
challenge. In its 2013-2014 Annual Information Form, 
Banro describes this challenge as follows: “Some or 
all of the Company’s properties are inhabited by artisanal 
miners. These conditions may interfere with work on the 
Company’s properties and present a potential security 
threat to the Company’s employees. There is a risk that 
5  DRC mining code 2002, Title 4, Chapter 1, Article 110.
6  Namoya is located in Maniema province, close to the 
border with South-Kivu (Banro, 2014a).
7  So far, less than 12% of the 2,638 square kilometers 
covered by these 14 exploration permits has been explored 
using modern techniques (Banro, 2014b: p.2).
operations of the Company may be delayed or interfered 
with, due to the conditions of political instability, violence 
and the inhabitation of the properties by artisanal miners. 
The Company uses its best efforts to maintain good 
relations with the local communities in order to minimize 
such risks.” (Banro, 2014c: p. 16). 
Defusing the social minefield
Our research focusses on the mining town of 
Kamituga, where more than 13,000 artisanal miners 
are operating within a concession area of Banro. The 
company is currently still in the exploration phase, 
but hopes to move to the production phase in the 
(near) future. In practice, the production mode in 
Kamituga is therefore characterized by a duality and 
tension between LSM and ASM. As the concession 
is granted to Banro, the artisanal miners are de jure 
invaders engaged in illegal activities. But the miners 
see things differently. Taking recourse to customary 
rules and traditional rights, they perceive their 
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Fig. 1. Research and exploitation permits versus artisanal 
mining zones in South-Kivu. Source: own compilation based 
on IPIS (International Peace Information Service) and CAMI (DRC 
Cadastre Minier) datasets.
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Miners may only willingly leave the company’s 
concessions if they can access productive mining 
zones elsewhere, or develop attractive alternative 
livelihoods outside the mining sector. Both a 
relocation and reorientation of artisanal miners are 
however problematic.
As such, legal access to productive artisanal mining 
zones is quasi non-existent. Figure 1 shows a map 
of the research and exploitation permits which have 
been granted to LSM-companies in South Kivu. The 
seven AEZs can barely be spotted. Two options to 
create additional space for ASM are currently being 
explored. First, civil society organizations lobby with 
the Mining Registry to force holders of “dormant 
titles” to either renew or renounce their exploration 
license. According to the Mining Code, an exploration 
permit is “dormant” if the holder has not started 
exploration activities within four years or if the 
license has not been renewed. When a dormant title 
is renewed, the holder automatically relinquishes 
50% of the perimeter.8 The hope is to convert some 
dormant areas into AEZ, but so far this hope has not 
materialized. A second option is to create “ASM-
tolerated” zones within mining concessions of LSM 
companies, e.g. in areas which are less suitable 
for industrial mining but still interesting for ASM. 
This strategy is however subject to changes in the 
Mining Code, which does not allow LSM and ASM to 
take place within the same concession.9  The Mining 
Code is currently being revised, but it is unclear 
whether this matter will be resolved. 
Besides the lack of AEZs, a relocation of artisanal 
miners can further be complicated if miners are 
reluctant to migrate. Contrary to the image of highly 
mobile artisanal miners, the majority of miners we 
interviewed in Kamituga were not willing to migrate 
outside their “chefferie” 10. Kamituga may be an 
exception in this regard. In contrast with smaller 
ASM sites, which sometimes consist of provisory 
camps, Kamituga is South-Kivu’s third largest town 
(after Bukavu and Uvira) with a population close to 
200,000. Many miners have lived in Kamituga their 
whole life and have invested in a house which they 
share with their family. If ASM would no longer be 
possible in Kamituga, the miners we spoke to would 
therefore rather reorient towards different economic 
8  DRC Mining Code 2002, Title 3, Chapter 1, Articles 61 - 62
9  DRC Mining Code 2002, Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 30
10  South-Kivu is divided into 8 territories, which are 
subdivided in “chefferies” or “chiefdoms”.  
activities than migrate to another mining site.
In terms of alternative activities, especially technical 
professions (such as mechanic and carpenter) and 
small trade activities were considered appealing. 
Most of our interviewees abandoned school 
at a young age, however, and have little or no 
professional experience outside of mining. Another 
frequently mentioned concern echoes that “everyone 
in Kamituga is a gold digger”, referring to miners’ 
impression that the entire economy of Kamituga 
depends on money generated by the artisanal 
mining sector. They wonder who will be able to pay 
for non-mining services if the gold from artisanal 
mining no longer fuels the local economy?   
Because their earnings are extremely volatile, 
estimating revenues for artisanal miners is very 
difficult. Nevertheless, in South-Kivu revenues from 
gold mining seem to compare favorably to those 
of likely alternative activities such as agriculture 
and informal businesses (Geenen, 2014).11 Miners’ 
reservation wage – the wage that would make them 
willingly abandon ASM – may therefore be higher 
than the earning potential in alternative activities. 
Furthermore, as compensation for quitting their 
11  The World Bank (2008) estimates that an artisanal miner 
in DRC has an average annual gross income of US$ 1,600. 
Recent research by IPIS (2014) indicates that gold miners in 
Eastern DRC may earn on average between US$70 and 105 
per month. Geenen (2014) estimates that gold miners in her 
sample in South-Kivu may earn between US$36 and 118 per 
month during preparatory periods, and between US$ 128 and 
195 during periods of high production.
Fig. 2. Artisanal miners in Kamituga
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We study the nexus between mineral resources, employment opportunities and conflict 
in the artisanal gold mining sector of South-Kivu, DRC. Our research has so far been 
concentrated on the mining site of Kamituga, where we conducted three rounds of 
fieldwork over the past two years. In the coming months we will conduct a large-scale 
quantitative survey among 300 artisanal miners in Kamituga. Our research is financially 
supported by FWO (the Research Foundation Flanders) and CEGEMI (Centre d’Expertise en 
Gestion Minière). Detailed information on our research set-up and progress is available on 
www.nikstoop.com.    
ASM-activities, miners expect Banro to organize 
professional- and business training, as well as 
provide financial assistance during the start-up 
phase of a new activity. In addition, it is expected 
that Banro invests in public goods such as schooling, 
healthcare and infrastructure. These expectations 
may be unrealistically high: accommodating 
Kamituga’s population and its large number of 
artisanal miners largely surpasses the capacity and 
responsibility of a private company. Realizing this, 
Banro has teamed-up with a large donor (USAID) to 
address the challenge. Specifically, their partnership 
will be “designed to support economic opportunities 
for artisanal miners and community residents and 
to help reposition artisanal miners in sustainable 
mining activities or alternative livelihoods” (Banro, 
2014a: p.14).
In theory, a reorientation of artisanal miners could 
be financially supported based on mining royalties 
paid by LSM companies. The 2002 Mining Code 
requires a retrocession of mining royalties of which 
60% should go to the central government, 25% 
should be paid to the province, and 15% should go to 
the local community.12 Such royalties – if effectively 
received and properly managed by the provincial 
and local authorities – could imply considerable 
injections of cash, which could provide communities 
with the necessary financial leverage to promote 
alternative livelihoods. It is currently unclear how 
the local, provincial and national governments 
will play a role in the public-private partnership 
that is being initiated by USAID and BANRO. Their 
involvement is, however, key. Although state 
capacity is extremely low, the involvement of 
state-actors is crucial to counter the already visible 
“retreat of the state”.
12  For precious metals, such as gold, the mining royalties 
amount to 2,5% of the amount of sales minus a number of 
deductible costs (DRC mining code 2002, Title 4, Chapter 3, 
Articles 240-242).
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